Efficient market hypothesis: is the Croatian stock market as (in)efficient as the U.S. market by Velimir Šonje et al.
V
E
L
I
M
I
R
 
Š
O
N
J
E
,
 
D
E
N
I
S
 
A
L
A
J
B
E
G
,
 
Z
O
R
A
N
 
B
U
B
A
Š
:
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
T
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
H
Y
P
O
T
H
E
S
I
S
:
 
I
S
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
A
S
 
(
I
N
)
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
T
 
A
S
 
T
H
E
 
U
.
S
.
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
5
 
(
3
)
 
3
0
1
-
3
2
6
 
(
2
0
1
1
)
301 Efficient market 
hypothesis: is the Croatian 
stock market as (in)efficient 
as the U.S. market
VELIMIR ŠONJE, MSc*1
Arhivanalitika, Zagreb; and Zagreb School 
of  Economics and Management, Zagreb
vsonje@arhivanalitika.hr
DENIS ALAJBEG, PhD*
Zagreb School of Economics and Management, Zagreb
dalajbeg@zsem.hr
ZORAN BUBAŠ, PhD*
Zagreb School of Economics and Management, Zagreb
zbubas@zsem.hr
Preliminary communication**2
JEL: G14
UDC: 336.7 
*  The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions.
** Received: November 28, 2010
   Accepted: June 10, 2011V
E
L
I
M
I
R
 
Š
O
N
J
E
,
 
D
E
N
I
S
 
A
L
A
J
B
E
G
,
 
Z
O
R
A
N
 
B
U
B
A
Š
:
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
T
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
H
Y
P
O
T
H
E
S
I
S
:
 
I
S
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
A
S
 
(
I
N
)
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
T
 
A
S
 
T
H
E
 
U
.
S
.
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
5
 
(
3
)
 
3
0
1
-
3
2
6
 
(
2
0
1
1
)
302 Abstract
Traditional statistical tests of serial independence of stock price changes often 
show that stock markets are inefﬁ  cient. Our analysis on daily and monthly data 
conﬁ  rms this ﬁ  nding for the Croatian and U.S. markets in the 2002-2010 period. 
However, this result seems to be mainly due to the impact of the crisis of 2008-
2009. The observation of monthly data in the pre-crisis period suggests market 
efﬁ  ciency in the U.S. and (rather surprisingly) in Croatia also. Daily data indica-
te a high degree of efﬁ  ciency of the US stock market before the crisis, but it is 
impossible to conclude with a satisfying level of conﬁ  dence that the Croatian 
market was inefﬁ  cient in that period.
Furthermore, an elementary moving average crossover trading system beats the 
CROBEX and S&P 500 indices from 1997 to 2010, indicating market inefﬁ  ciency. 
Still, if the same trading rule is applied to the S&P 500 index in an extended time 
period between 1950 and 2010, the conclusion about market inefﬁ  ciency becomes 
less convincing. It seems that (in)efﬁ  ciency varies both across markets and in the 
same markets in the long run, but it still remains unknown which processes are the 
driving factors behind these changes.
Keywords: efﬁ  cient market hypothesis, capital markets, CROBEX, S&P 500
1 INTRODUCTION
The main motivation for writing this paper is the lack of research in the area of 
so-called weak-form stock market efﬁ  ciency in Croatia. Although the Croatian 
stock market has existed for twenty years and has developed a solid infrastructure, 
the very low liquidity still places it in the emerging market category1. The ﬁ  rst 
steps in testing its efﬁ  ciency by measuring autocorrelation of returns started only 
recently (Barbić, 2010). The objective of this paper is to supplement traditional 
statistical testing with the assessment of a chosen trading rule (trading system) and 
compare the results obtained on the Croatian market with ﬁ  ndings on a more de-
veloped equity market (U.S.). We used the same methodology in testing for so-
called weak-form statistical and trading efﬁ  ciency on these two markets and found 
similar results: a surprisingly similar efﬁ  ciency before the recent crisis and a so-
mewhat less surprising inefﬁ  ciency in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The analysis also revealed trading inefﬁ  ciency, as it proved to be easy to 
ﬁ  nd a trading rule that beat the market.
A similar in(efﬁ  ciency) in capital markets as different as those in Croatia and the 
U.S. is not a puzzle if one takes into account a number of problems related with 
the design of empirical tests and interpretation of their results. The common deno-
minator of numerous formulations of the Efﬁ  cient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is 
the idea that investors cannot beat the market in the long run. The market is con-
sidered efﬁ  cient if participants using all available information (including past pri-
1 Annual stock market turnover to GDP ratio is consistently below 7%. V
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303 ce changes) cannot create strategies that consistently beat the average market re-
turns. Many papers testing this main postulate of the EMH have been published. 
The usual procedure is to test for serial independence of stock price changes. Sta-
tistical serial independence of price changes (zero autocorrelation) implies that it 
is not possible to forecast future price changes using observed past prices changes. 
In this case, prices follow a “random walk” pattern – today’s changes have no in-
ﬂ  uence on tomorrow’s price changes. However it remains puzzling whether some 
degree of statistical predictability of future on the basis of past returns is enough 
for investors (at least for “sophisticated traders”) to be able to exploit this infor-
mation proﬁ  tably. 
Formulation of the weak-form market efﬁ  ciency condition based on the random 
walk model was dominant in economic thought until the 60s. However, Samuel-
son (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) showed that price behavior associated with the 
martingale model rather than the random walk model is a better description of 
asset price movements in an informationally efﬁ  cient market. An implication of 
the martingale model is that a market can be efﬁ  cient even if there is correlation 
of successive price changes under the assumption that economic agents are risk 
averse (LeRoy, 1989). The same implication follows from the rational expecta-
tions formulation of efﬁ  cient market theory (LeRoy, 1973; Lucas, 1978). Also, 
one should not be surprised to detect serial correlation of changes in prices of ﬁ  -
nancial instruments in informationally efﬁ  cient markets when there are large 
changes in exogenous variables such as income, wealth and/or attitudes towards 
risk.2 However, the ﬁ  nding of serial independence of price changes is still an indi-
cation of market efﬁ  ciency. 
Therefore statistical tests in the random walk tradition have weak theoretical foun-
dations and are of dubious importance for market participants. No wonder that 
statisticians as well as some economists on one hand, and investors on the other, 
do not perceive market (in)efﬁ  ciency in the same way. For a market practitioner 
inefﬁ  ciency is the existence of a winning trading system that consistently genera-
tes proﬁ  ts above the benchmark, which represents the market. However, there are 
weak theoretical foundations for this type of test, too.
Filter rules/mechanical trading systems are precise instructions about when to buy 
or sell a ﬁ  nancial instrument with the goal of achieving above-average proﬁ  ts. 
Tests of ﬁ  lter rules/mechanical trading systems have been performed for decades 
with varying successes (in terms of “beating” market indices). Interpretations of 
their results have varied even more than the results themselves. Some authors (e.g. 
Fama, 1965; Fama and Blume, 1966) interpreted the impossibility of beating the 
market in favor of the EMH, although they did not discuss how many trading rules 
are possible or the signiﬁ  cance of ﬁ  nding a rule or several rules that did not beat 
the market. Similarly, the discovery of a rule/trading system that beats the market 
2 See Le Roy (1989) for a useful survey of the literature.V
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304 average has no clear cut theoretical interpretation in terms of market (in)efﬁ  ciency 
as it is not clear how probable it is to ﬁ  nd such a rule by chance. Notwithstanding 
theoretical problems, such a ﬁ  nding catches the attention of stock traders.
Given the theoretical limits described above, this paper provides a substantial 
body of descriptive statistical evidence about the functioning of the Croatian stock 
market (Zagreb Stock Exchange) in the period 1997-2010. Descriptive evidence 
is organized and interpreted within the theoretical tradition of market efﬁ  ciency. 
Given the numerous ambiguities that are present within this tradition3 we urge 
readers to interpret the results critically. We hope we have provided guidance re-
garding caution in the interpretation of results throughout the paper. 
The paper is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the second part gives 
an overview of the literature related to traditional market efﬁ  ciency testing, as 
well as research done on the effectiveness of various trading systems/ﬁ  lter rules. 
In the third section, data and methodology are described. The fourth section pre-
sents and interprets the results. The ﬁ  fth section discusses the problems with inter-
preting the results. Concluding remarks are found in the ﬁ  nal section. 
2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW
Fama (1965) tested for serial independence of Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) component price changes. He concluded that markets are efﬁ  cient, with 
prices behaving like a “random walk” although the distribution of price changes 
was not gaussian. Numerous researchers built upon his work. Earlier studies sup-
ported Fama’s proposition, but most of the work conducted later, especially in the 
80s on developed and emerging markets, questioned the serial independence of 
price changes. For example, Poterba and Summers (1988) examined the U.S. and 
seventeen other developed markets and found that returns were positively corre-
lated in the short-term and negatively correlated in the long-term. This was backed 
up by Fama and French (1988) who found negative serial correlation of long-term 
returns. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) detected positive serial correlation of short-
term price changes (less than one year). 
Although the outcome of these studies points to the presence of short-term trends 
and long-term mean-reversion in the stock markets, this ultimately did not lead to 
the formulation of usable trading strategies. A hint as to this was given by Jega-
deesh and Titman (1993) who concluded that stocks that had outperformed the 
market in the past 3 to 12 months tended to outperform the market in the following 
3 to 12 months. While the performance of individual stocks remains highly unpre-
dictable, the authors state that the market can be beaten by constructing portfolios 
of the best performing stocks in the recent past. Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) 
also observed return predictability that changes with time – it is higher in eco-
3 LeRoy (1989) also provides for a thorough review of these ambiguities.V
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305 nomically volatile periods (like the 1970s) and signiﬁ  cantly lower in economi-
cally relatively calm decades (like the 1960s and 1980s).4 
Similar outcomes were observed while testing emerging markets. Harvey (1994) 
and Claessens et al. (1995) conclude that emerging markets (with a heavy weight-
ing of South American and Asian emerging markets) show signiﬁ  cant serial cor-
relations of returns, indicating that serial correlation may indeed have some value 
as an indicator of market (in)efﬁ  ciency. Earlier studies of the new European 
emerging markets showed the inefﬁ  ciency of the Polish stock market in the ﬁ  rst 
half of the 1990s (Nivet, 1997), which was in contrast with ﬁ  ndings for the Hun-
garian market. According to Chun (2000), it exhibited no predictability of returns 
although it was in its infancy in the 1990s. Mateus (2004) notices high serial cor-
relation of returns on stock markets of the 13 new EU accession countries. Com-
parable ﬁ  ndings came from Cajueiro and Tabak (2006), who observed short- and 
long-term predictability of returns on European transition markets. Barbić (2010) 
investigated the Croatian market and found some statistically signiﬁ  cant but un-
stable autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients with low values that are hardly associated with 
meaningful trading strategies.
Simultaneously with testing for autocorrelation, academics and market practition-
ers tested the EMH by comparing the buy and hold strategy (which supposedly 
produces average market return) with ﬁ  lter rules/mechanical trading systems.5 
The most popular mechanical trading systems are breakout and moving average 
crossover systems. One simple example of a breakout system is “buy when the 
price of a security breaks above its 10-day high and sell when the price falls 2% 
below its subsequent high”. Moving average crossover systems are based on the 
assumption that when a short-term moving average (MA) crosses a longer-term 
MA from below one should buy because a new uptrend is about to be formed. The 
opposite should be done when the shorter MA crosses the longer from above, 
since a new downtrend is likely to emerge.
The main premise here is that if mechanical trading systems were consistently to 
outperform the market index, then market efﬁ  ciency could be challenged. Alexan-
der (1961), Fama (1965), and Fama and Blume (1966) tested ﬁ  lter rules on the 
U.S. market and found that they cannot generate above-average trading proﬁ  ts. 
Van Horne and Parker (1967) chose 30 U.S. stocks at random and bought and sold 
them based on their price crossing the 200-, 150- and 100-day moving average. 
They found that none of the price-moving average combinations resulted in proﬁ  ts 
that could not be achieved by the simple buy and hold strategy. 
4 Drifts in predictability are associated with different market regimes in bull (high return-low volatility) and bear 
(low return-high volatility) markets. It is very well documented that all correlations tend to increase in bear mar-
ket regimes. See Kunovac (2011) for a useful review of the literature and results for the Croatian market. 
5 Statistical tests of autocorrelation and the tests of trading rules/systems are not the only tests of EMH. Many 
event studies indicating violations of EMH gave birth to an astonishingly wide field of behavioural finance. A 
reader should look for surveys of behavioural finance elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Shefrin, 2002).V
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306 More recent studies give a different picture, though. Brock et al. (1992) tested 
various breakout and moving average crossovers systems on the DJIA from 1897 
to 1986. They stated the superiority of technical trading systems over the buy and 
hold strategy. Buy and sell signals consistently generated returns higher than “nor-
mal” results. Kwon and Kish (2002) support the Brock et al. study using a sample 
of broader market-cap weighted indices like the NYSE and NASDAQ. They found 
that technical trading rules added value by capturing proﬁ  t opportunities when 
compared to a buy and hold strategy. Siegel’s ﬁ  ndings (2002) are also intriguing: 
investment based on a long-term trading rule beat the NASDAQ Composite, and 
fared only slightly worse than the DJIA (but with signiﬁ  cantly lower risk). 
Fiﬁ  eld et al. (2008) examined moving average rules for 15 emerging and 3 devel-
oped markets over the period of 1989-2003. Their results indicate that the return 
behavior of emerging markets differed markedly from that of their developed 
market counterparts; moving average rules were more proﬁ  table when tested us-
ing emerging stock market indices. In addition, this proﬁ  tability persisted for 
longer moving averages, suggesting that trends in stock returns were larger and 
more persistent in emerging markets. Jagric et al. (2005) tested ﬁ  ve Central Euro-
pean markets (Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and 
Russia on the effect the transition process had on the market efﬁ  ciency. They 
tested these markets with a technical trading system comprised of an MA crosso-
ver system (15-50 days) for trending periods and the Relative Strength Index 
(RSI) for sideways periods.6 With the exception of Slovakia and Poland the me-
chanical trading system outperformed the buy and hold strategy.
The brief literature review presented here comprises only a small fraction of liter-
arily hundreds of relevant studies, the sheer number ensuring that any attempt at 
comprehensiveness would be certain to fail. Instead, the main purpose of this re-
view is to illustrate the diversity of the empirical ﬁ  ndings, which provide very few 
priors. This is hardly a surprise given the fact that theoretical underpinnings of in-
formationally efﬁ  cient markets and their statistical tests are vague. In this respect, 
tests of serial correlations of price changes can be interpreted as efﬁ  ciency tests 
only under very restrictive conditions of random walk in stock prices, which is not 
considered to be a valid theory of asset price movements. Moreover, it implies risk 
neutrality and no signiﬁ  cant changes in exogenous variables such as income, 
wealth or risk-appetite, not to mention technological changes. For that reason, ﬁ  nd-
ing serial dependence does not lead to rejection of EMH. However, ﬁ  nding serial 
independence is an indication of efﬁ  ciency. Similarly, mechanical trading systems 
may be very interesting for market practitioners but there is no clear theoretical 
pathway showing how to interpret the implications of their results on market efﬁ  -
ciency. Readers should bear this in mind while interpreting our results.
6 The relative strength index (RSI) measures the relative strength of price changes when prices go up vs. price 
changes when prices go down. It is considered to be a technical measure of momentum. Its maximum value 
equals 100, which is reached when exponential moving average of downward changes in prices equals zero.V
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307 3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Our test of market efﬁ  ciency of the Croatian stock market (Zagreb Stock Exchan-
ge – ZSE) rests on two pillars. The ﬁ  rst part of our market efﬁ  ciency test is the 
statistical test of autocorrelation. The second part is an attempt to ﬁ  nd a simple 
trading rule that would exceed returns of the stock index in the long run. We com-
pared ZSE and NYSE with the use of both approaches.
3.1 STATISTICAL TEST OF AUTOCORRELATION OF RETURNS
For Croatia, the analysis was based on ofﬁ  cial stock index data of the Zagreb 
Stock Exchange (CROBEX) from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 2010. Of interest here 
is the autocorrelation of changes in the value of the CROBEX market index. The 
analytical technique used in Lo (2004:23) was used to compare results for Croatia 
and the U.S. Lo’s (2004) data for the U.S. comprise 133 years of monthly returns 
on the S&P 500 in the period from 1871 to 2003. He shows successive autocorre-
lation coefﬁ  cients of investment returns on the U.S. stock exchange index Stan-
dard & Poor’s (S&P 500) by ﬁ  xing the sample size to 60 months and successively 
moves (“rolls”) the time sample towards the last – most recent monthly observa-
tion. As this is a 60-month forward moving sample, the ﬁ  rst observation of auto-
correlation is in the 61st month following the ﬁ  rst observation in the sample. Lo 
(2004) computed and plotted the ﬁ  rst-order autocorrelation for each sample. Ba-
sed on the changes in autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients for successive time periods he 
obtains a time series showing a “degree” of market efﬁ  ciency: the market is “less 
efﬁ  cient” if autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients move further away from zero and vice 
versa. 
Here we created a replica of Lo’s (2004) results on the sample of data from 1876 
to 2010, using Robert Shiller’s (2010) database (ﬁ  gure 1). One sees a relatively 
high average autocorrelation of returns, ranging from 20% to 30%. Lo (2004) 
used this result to support the conclusion that the U.S. capital market is inefﬁ  cient. 
Also, strong variations of the autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient across time support his 
belief that market (in)efﬁ  ciency drastically changes over time. Lo (2004) consi-
ders that in more recent times market efﬁ  ciency quickly decreases (autocorrela-
tion increases) after reaching efﬁ  ciency peak in 1997, as conﬁ  rmed by the data 
from the replica in ﬁ  gure 1 up to 2010. Large autocorrelation variations in the long 
run conﬁ  rm the idea developed in the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH)7 tradi-
tion that structural changes appear in the market over long-term periods that may 
be related to changes in psychological characteristics of market participants (risk 
aversion), regulation, institutional infrastructure, wealth, technology, etc.
7 The adaptive market hypothesis, as proposed by Andrew Lo (2004, 2005), is an attempt to reconcile theo-
ries that imply that the markets are efficient with behavioral alternatives, by applying the principles of evolu-
tion – competition, adaptation, and natural selection – to financial interactions.V
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308 FIGURE 1 
Autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient of monthly returns on the S&P 500 index on the 
60-month moving time sample from 1876 to 2010  (%)
Sources: Lo (2004), Shiller (2010) and authors’ calculations.
It is of critical importance to distinguish “noise” from signiﬁ  cant variability of 
autocorrelation. It may be that only the most extreme upper and lower observa-
tions have some signiﬁ  cance. For that purpose, critical values for the two-sided 
test of statistical signiﬁ  cance of linear correlation coefﬁ  cients are calculated by 
the following formula:
  N
z
1
0 2 / α ±
 
(1)
where N is the sample size, i.e. the number of observations in the period observed. 
If the absolute value of the correlation coefﬁ  cient exceeds the critical value, the 
autocorrelation is different from zero at the given signiﬁ  cance level.
In ﬁ  gure 1 above, the following four periods of efﬁ  ciency would be of interest at 
a statistical signiﬁ  cance level of 1%8: (a) the very beginning of the 20th century; 
(b) early 1920s; (c) mid-1950s; and (d) late 1990s. Also of interest would be the 
following inefﬁ  ciency peaks: (a) the time of the 1907 crisis and WWI; (b) before 
and after the Great Depression; (c) early 1960s; and (d) late 1980s and early 
1990s.9 The recent market situation also indicates inefﬁ  ciency.
The ﬁ  rst observation for Croatia is in January 1997, so the calculation of autocor-
relations begins 60 months later. One month is lost due to calculation of monthly 
changes and another one due to the shift of the ﬁ  rst order, so the relevant time 
period is March 2002 – May 2010, i.e. 98 monthly observations. The end of the 
month observation is taken as the data for that month. 
8 Critical value at 5% significance level of the two-sided test is 25.3%.
9 Even a cursory look indicates the fact that inefficiency peaks are somehow linked to crises.
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309 As far as daily data is concerned, in the period from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 
2010, there were 3,335 trading days on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. In the same 
period, there were 3,466 trading days on the New York Stock Exchange. This 
difference in the sample size (3.9%) has no signiﬁ  cant bearing on the results. The 
ﬁ  rst 5-year sample (1,236 trading days) of daily data for Croatia comprises chan-
ges in the CROBEX from 3 January 1997 to 3 January 2002. We observed the 
correlation between daily changes over that time sample and daily changes in the 
period of the same duration moved forward by one day. Moving the time period of 
the same duration day by day until the last observation on 2 June 2010 (“rolling”) 
provides a sequence of 2,100 autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients for one-day lagged 
2,100 sub-periods, i.e. time samples from 4 January 2002 to 2 June 2010. The 
percentage of 2,100 coefﬁ  cients that exceeds critical values was observed. Critical 
values for the time sample of 1,236 observations are 7.3% at a signiﬁ  cance level 
of 1% and 5.6% at a signiﬁ  cance level of 5% of the two-sided test. 
3.2 FILTER TEST / MECHANICAL TRADING SYSTEM
Moving averages are among the most popular technical analysis tools. Due to 
differences in the number of days entered in the calculation, there are in theory as 
many moving averages as there are investors. Still, stockcharts.com highlights the 
most popular ones: 5-20-day averages are most often used to present short-term 
market trends, 50-day averages are used for medium-term trends and 200-day 
moving averages are used to determine long-term trends. 
In addition to simple moving averages in which all prices have the same weight, 
market participants use the exponential moving average (EMA):
 
EMAt = PtK + EMAt–1 (1 – K)
 
(2)
where Pt is today’s price, N is the number of days for which the exponential mo-
ving average is calculated and K is the weight of the most recent observation:
  K = 2/(N + 1)  (3)
The most recent price, which enters the calculation last, has the greatest weight in 
calculation of averages, while the oldest price has the least weight. This is why 
EMA reﬂ  ects the current situation in the market more objectively than simple mo-
ving averages where the oldest and the most recent price receive the same weight. 
So far, it has not been proved beyond doubt that the use of exponential moving 
averages is more proﬁ  table that the use of simple averages. Still, the more logical 
assumption that more recent prices are more relevant in securities trading than 
older prices prevailed in the selection of the method. This is the main reason why 
exponential moving averages are used. V
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310 There are several basic ways of using moving averages for the purpose of securi-
ties trading (Murphy, 1999): (a) buy when the price exceeds the chosen moving 
average, and sell when its price falls below the moving average; (b) buy when the 
chosen moving average turns up, and sell when the chosen moving average turns 
down (Elder, 2002); and (c) buy when the shorter moving average (e.g. 20-day) 
crosses above the longer moving average (e.g. 50-day), and sell when the shorter 
moving average crosses below the longer moving average (moving averages cros-
sing). The time horizon of an investment based on moving averages depends on 
the chosen length of moving averages: the shorter the moving averages, the shor-
ter expected period of investment, and vice versa. For example, a trading based on 
the crossover of the 10-day moving average generates a signal to buy/sell every 
few days, while the approach applied to a 200-day moving average results in only 
several transactions a year. The CROBEX and S&P 500 were tested using the 
moving average crossover strategy, where the 50-day EMA was taken as the shor-
ter moving average and the 200-day EMA was used as the long-term moving 
average (50/200 EMA). The moving averages were selected with the intent to 
create a trading system that will rarely give signals to buy/sell and thus keep an 
investor within the prevalent trend for as long as possible. This combination, whi-
le generally accepted among market participants and often used in determining 
long-term trends in the market (Carr, 2008) is not prominently covered in the li-
sted academic research. 
The simulations were run by using MetaStock version 10.1 (Equis International) 
software. The testing period begins on 2 September 1997 and ends on 2 Septem-
ber 2010 (a total of 3,250 trading days). Initial capital is 100,000 monetary units 
(mu). The trading system manages the funds according to the following rules: (a) 
when the 50-day moving average crosses above the 200-day moving average, to-
tal capital is invested in the CROBEX at the opening price on the ﬁ  rst day after the 
crossing (if the opening price is not available in the system, the closing price on 
the ﬁ  rst day after the crossing is used); (b) when the 50-day moving average cros-
ses below the 200-day moving average, the whole position is sold at the opening 
price on the ﬁ  rst day after the crossing (if the opening price is not available in the 
system, the closing price on the ﬁ  rst day after the crossing is used); (c) purchase 
and sale transaction costs are equal to 1% of the current portfolio value; (d) in 
periods when not invested in the market, the investor earns an average annual rate 
of 3% on cash. The trading system allows only for the entire portfolio to be expo-
sed to equity risk or the entire portfolio to be returned to the neutral position 
(cash). Real strategies can be much more complex. For example, a partial portfo-
lio exposure to stocks and partial holding of cash is possible. Such strategies are 
not analyzed as they cannot provide a clear picture of superiority over the market 
average. Also, it is possible to exclude a neutral cash position and analyze the 
strategy of continuous two sided exposure to equity. This strategy is subject to 
errors in both directions and yields a much poorer result than the neutral position 
strategy.V
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311 Although the period of the last 14 years represents a “large sample” in statistical 
terms, when concluding on the validity of trading rules the size of the sample 
cannot be deﬁ  ned by the same method as one would decide on the sample size to 
conclude on probabilities in coin tossing or another phenomenon whose “drawi-
ngs” are random. In this case it is known that the nature of serial dependence va-
ries across time. This means that longer historical periods may have unique cha-
racteristics, which market participants have to learn during the periods themsel-
ves. These structural characteristics of the market change from time to time, the-
reby changing the rules of the game. Learning then starts from the beginning. In 
this light, a hypothesis may be proposed that the rule will ﬁ  nd it much harder (if 
at all) to beat the market over an extended period of time since that time fra-
mework includes structurally different periods during which there are learning 
cycles and the winning strategies change. This is why the S&P 500 index was used 
to test the moving average crossover system in the period from 3 January 1950 to 
2 September 2010 (a total of 15,266 trading days).
4 RESULTS: CROATIA AND THE U.S. 
4.1   STATISTICAL TEST OF AUTOCORRELATION OF SUCCESSIVE 
PRICE CHANGES
The CROBEX index and the moving 20-day standard deviation of its daily chan-
ges are shown in ﬁ  gure 2. It is evident that the 1990s were extremely volatile, with 
much larger swings than in the ﬁ  rst decade of the 21st century, which was marked 
by a very tranquil period of index growth up to 2007. At that time, ﬂ  uctuations 
began to increase, and the crisis escalated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(September 2008). Then the variance of price changes decreased again as index 
begun to rise.
FIGURE 2 
CROBEX index (left scale) and the measure of its volatility (right scale, %) 
in the period from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 2010
Sources: Zagreb Stock Exchange (2010) and authors’ calculations.
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312 Figure 3 shows autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients of monthly returns on the CROBEX and 
S&P 500 indexes on the 60-month moving monthly time samples from March 2002 
to May 2010. This ﬁ  gure compares a replica of Lo’s (2004) results shown in ﬁ  gure 1 
with time series of successive autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients obtained on CROBEX. 
CROBEX had a lower average autocorrelation of successive monthly price changes 
than S&P 500 from March 2002 to May 2010. Similarity of changes in autocorrelation 
patterns from 2007 to 2010 is striking. First, autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients were approa-
ching zero in both markets in late 2007/early 2008. Then there was a sharp coordinated 
increase associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Autocor-
relations subsequently remained at elevated levels in both markets. Coefﬁ  cients are not 
statistically different from zero at 5% signiﬁ  cance level until 2007.10 Then U.S. market 
becomes inefﬁ  cient (statistically signiﬁ  cant positive serial correlation of price chan-
ges) for a very short period in 2007 (see the local peak in 2007) and then both markets 
became inefﬁ  cient after Lehman Brothers collapse as coefﬁ  cients rose at about 30%. It 
is striking that two such different markets produce such similar time series of autocor-
relation coefﬁ  cients at monthly frequencies:11 the linear correlation coefﬁ  cient of time 
series of autocorrelation coefﬁ  ci  ents in Croatia and the U.S. for the 2002-2010 period 
stands at a very high 73.6% for monthly price changes. 
The result indicating large similarities in (in)efﬁ  ciency of two extremely different 
capital markets may be considered a puzzle. The usual assumption is that the U.S. 
market, which is several thousand times more liquid than the Croatian market (not 
to mention the longevity, institutional structure and experience of participants), 
should be much more efﬁ  cient. Numerous empirical studies of both developing 
and developed countries conﬁ  rmed such a relationship, the literature mainly di-
scussing whether a lower degree of institutional development and liquidity (i.e. 
higher market risk in developing countries) may account for a higher return on 
investment in stocks listed on these markets (Barbić, 2010).
On the other hand, if one remembers that Lo (2004) was also surprised by the fact 
that the New York Stock Exchange today may not be as efﬁ  cient as in some periods 
15, 50, 100 and even more years ago, the result of the comparison between Croatia 
and the U.S. should not come as a surprise. There are market processes in force 
that in the long run considerably change the statistical characteristics of stock 
price time series. These processes also signiﬁ   cantly change the relationship 
between efﬁ  ciency of different markets – regardless of the degree of their deve-
lopment. Unfortunately, which processes are in force and how they create changes 
10 A figure with daily data, not given here, is very similar. It also shows rapid transitions of autocorrelation 
characteristics of time series of monthly price changes. Notice that the Croatian monthly time series exhibits 
two additional periods of rapid transitions: one in 2003 (increase) and another in 2005 (decrease). Also note 
that the presented autocorrelation coefficient of monthly returns is significantly different from zero: on the 
60-month sample, significance of the difference from zero at the level of 1% is achieved with a coefficient 
value of 33.2%; for the 5% significance level, the critical value is 25.3%, while for the 10% significance the 
critical value is 21.2%.
11 This is in line with Kunovac’s (2011) finding about increase of both intra-market and inter-market corre-
lations in bear periods.V
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313 remains ambiguous. However, it is known that shifts in risk preferences (risk aver-
sion) could be one of their main determinants (Pesaran, 2010).
FIGURE 3 
Autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients of monthly returns on the CROBEX and S&P 500 
indexes on the 60-month moving time samples from March 2002 to May 2010 (%)
Sources: Zagreb Stock Exchange (2010), Lo (2004), Shiller (2010) and authors’ calculations.
In this particular case, one may assume that events during the crisis of 2008-2009 
played a key role in generating similarities between the two markets. Common exoge-
nous shocks spreading over the complex system of globally interconnected capital 
markets caused similar changes in autocorrelation characteristics of price changes in 
distant markets. Excluding from observation the crisis period from August 2007 on, the 
linear correlation coefﬁ  cient of successive autocorrelation coefﬁ  cients in Croatia and 
the U.S. falls to 24% from March 2002 to July 2007, conﬁ  rming that similarities arose 
in the crisis period only. A similar result is obtained by calculating a simple correlation 
of monthly returns. The linear correlation coefﬁ  cient of monthly returns on the CRO-
BEX and S&P 500 indices is twice as high in the overall period as that in pre-crisis 
period: it was 62% in the period from February 1997 to May 2010 and, when the crisis 
period is excluded and the period up to July 2007 included, it stands at 31%.
This ﬁ  nding, however, does not solve the whole puzzle. In the pre-crisis period, the 
autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient for monthly data moved close to zero in Croatia. As a 
rule, it did not exceed 10%. In the light of critical values, this means that the Croa-
tian market was efﬁ  cient at monthly frequencies. In the same period, the autocor-
relation moved around 15% in the U.S., with much smaller variations in successive 
time periods. Accepting the thesis that the monthly autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient re-
presents a measure of (in)efﬁ  ciency, one may conclude that the Croatian market 
was nearly as efﬁ  cient as the U.S. market in the decade preceding the crisis.
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314 Here we urge the reader to recall our introductory discussion on market (in)efﬁ  ciency. 
Correlation of successive price changes can be interpreted as a measure of 
(in)efﬁ  ciency under the restrictive assumption that an efﬁ  cient market is represen-
ted by a random walk. When this assumption is relaxed (by introducing the martin-
gales and/or rational expectations deﬁ  nition of efﬁ  cient market), an autocorrelation 
different from zero may emerge in an informationally efﬁ  cient market. What hap-
pened after collapse of Lehman Brothers in both markets is neither a surprise nor a 
sign that the market became inefﬁ  cient. What is surprising is the absence of auto-
correlation before the autumn of 2007 on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. It points to 
the fact that an even underdeveloped market may be efﬁ  cient.
Intriguing results obtained on monthly data called for a test on daily data (table 1). 
For CROBEX, the autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient of daily price changes exceeds the 
critical value at the level of 1% in 809 days or 38.5% of the total number of days 
in the sample. At the 5% level, the critical threshold is exceeded in 962 days or 
45.8% of the total number of days in the sample. These are strong indications of 
inefﬁ  ciency for the whole period – same result as with monthly price changes.
TABLE 1
Autocorrelation of daily changes in the CROBEX and S&P 500 indices in the pe-
riod from 2 January 1997 to 2 June 2010
CROBEX
Pre-crisis period (a) Overall period
Number of 
days = 
1,379
Signiﬁ  cance 
level (b)
Number of 
days = 
2,100
Signiﬁ  cance 
level (b)
5% 1% 5% 1%
Number of days when criti-
cal values are exceeded - 281 128 - 962 809
Share of days when critical 
values are exceeded in the 
total number of days
- 20.1% 9.2% - 45.8% 38.5%
S&P 500
Pre-crisis period (a) Overall period
Number of 
days = 
1,402
Signiﬁ  cance 
level
Number of 
days = 
2,207
Signiﬁ  cance 
level
5% 1% 5% 1%
Number of days when criti-
cal values are exceeded - 16 8 - 821 813
Share of days when critical 
values are exceeded in the 
total number of days
- 1.1% 0.6% - 23.7% 23.5%
Notes: (a) 1 August 2007 is set as the date when the crisis began and is not included in the cal-
culation; (b) CROBEX critical values are 7.3% for the significance level of 1% and 5.6% for the 
5% significance level. Critical values for the S&P 500 are approximately 0.1 percentage point 
lower (due to the slightly larger sample).
Sources: authors’ calculations based on daily ZSE data for the CROBEX and for the S&P 500 
Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.V
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315 Excluding the crisis period following 1 August 2007, the coefﬁ  cient exceeds the 
critical value at the level of 1% in 128 days or 9.2% of the total number of days, 
while the number of days when the critical value is exceeded at the 5% signiﬁ  can-
ce level increases to 281 days or 20.1% of the sample. The result is different for 
the pre-crisis compared with the whole period: at a sufﬁ  ciently high level of stati-
stical stringency; the number of successive time periods with the autocorrelation 
coefﬁ  cient different from zero is reduced to below one-tenth. It is difﬁ  cult to con-
clude whether this result means that the Croatian capital market was inefﬁ  cient – 
particularly in view of the fact that coefﬁ  cients are very small and, as a rule, do not 
exceed 15%. Taken together, two pieces of information (marginal statistical signi-
ﬁ  cance and size of coefﬁ  cient not exceeding 15%) were hardly useful for stock 
traders. Accordingly, we conclude that daily data do not strongly contradict the 
ﬁ  nding obtained on monthly data that the Zagreb Stock Exchange represented by 
CROBEX was an efﬁ  cient capital market prior to recent crisis. 
However, the U.S. capital market was very efﬁ  cient in the pre-crisis period as only 
1.1% and 0.6% respectively of coefﬁ  cients exceeded critical value (in addition, 
coefﬁ  cient values did not exceed 2% over the 2003-2007 cycle). The percentage 
of observations above critical value rises to over 20% when the crisis period is 
included in the observation. A comparison of these results with those of Lo (2004) 
leads to the conclusion that it is much more difﬁ  cult to discover autocorrelation of 
returns on daily data than on monthly data.
4.2 TRADING TEST: RULE
The notion that a market is to some extent inefﬁ  cient in statistical terms has no 
useful application if this supposed inefﬁ  ciency cannot be used for proﬁ  t. On the 
other hand, there is no widely accepted theoretical guidance regarding implica-
tions for market efﬁ  ciency if one ﬁ  nds a proﬁ  table trading rule. Notwithstanding 
theoretical problems, ﬁ  nding proﬁ  table trading rules provides intriguing informa-
tion for both academics and market practitioners. 
To date there has been no disclosure of any practicable investment strategy and/or 
trading system that would yield above-average proﬁ  ts in the Croatian capital 
market. However, the remainder of this paper will show that it is relatively easy to 
establish and disclose a trading rule that can beat the market and we hope to pro-
vide a plausible explanation why is this possible in section 5. 
In the brief literature overview, it was pointed out that more recent research found 
many trading systems that beat the market using past data. Also, better results 
were achieved by using longer-term trading systems than short-term trading stra-
tegies. The problem of short-term trading systems (apart from signiﬁ  cant transac-
tion costs) is that they operate at extremely high levels of noise. The shorter the 
observation period, the greater is the “noise”. This is particularly valid at intra-day 
and daily intervals (Elder, 2002). Over longer time horizons, noise becomes smal-
ler and the picture becomes clearer. V
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316 Long-term trading systems/rules are created with intent to obtain many fewer tra-
ding signals (to diminish transaction costs), so as to keep investors in harmony 
with the dominant trend for as long as possible. Long-term systems want to take 
the best from the buy and hold strategy – participation in the periods of stock price 
growth and avoidance of the worst – occasional sharp falls in portfolio value.
The results and a graphical presentation of the simulation of 50/200 EMA trading 
rule on CROBEX are shown in table 2 and ﬁ  gure 4. Results are interesting, to say 
the least. Using a simple and generally-known trading rule, the hypothetical inve-
stor considerably exceeded the return of the Croatian stock market. The initial 
capital of 100,000 monetary units increased to 291,088 in thirteen years, while the 
corresponding investment in the CROBEX ended the same period with the portfo-
lio value of only 165,632. Annual returns were 8.56% and 3.95% respectively. 
The system beat the CROBEX not only with regard to return; not less important 
is the fact that it was achieved at much less risk. The system was invested in the 
market for only 1,996 of the total 3,250 days or 61.41% of the overall period. It 
thereby evaded the major portion of losses during the bear market years (1998-
1999 and 2008-2009) with timely entries and long-enough presence during the 
bull market years (2000-2002 and 2004-2008). The only weakness of the system 
is the generation of a relatively large number of false signals – ﬁ  ve out of the total 
seven trades ended with a loss. However, the average proﬁ  t from good signals 
(135,576) was several times higher than the average loss on false signals (21,977). 
In thirteen years, the system gave no more than two false signals in a row.
TABLE 2
Testing the 50/200 EMA system and comparison with the CROBEX index in the 
period from 2 September 1997 to 2 September 2010
Closing portfolio 
value (mu)
Average annual 
return (%)
CROBEX  165,632 3.95
50/200 EMA 291,088 8.56
Total number of trades (a) 7
Proﬁ  table trades 2
Non-proﬁ  table trades 5
Largest number of non-proﬁ  table trades in a row 2
Average duration of proﬁ  table trades (in days) 766
Average proﬁ  t per proﬁ  table trade (mu) 135,576
Average duration of non-proﬁ  table trades (in days) 92
Average loss per non-proﬁ  table trade (mu) -21,977
50/200 EMA proﬁ  t relative to CROBEX proﬁ  t 191.15%
Total number of days in the market 1,996
Note: (a) A trade includes one purchase and one sale.
Source: Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.V
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FIGURE 4
CROBEX index and 50/200 EMA in the period from 2 September 1997 
to 2 September 2010
Source: Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.
The logical next step is the test of the same trading system on the most developed 
stock market in the world – the U.S. market. It is somewhat surprising that this 
simple trading system in the most liquid stock market in the world decisively de-
feated the buy and hold strategy, i.e. the market average (table 3 and ﬁ  gure 5). 
Results are even more impressive than those for Croatia because there were only 
ﬁ  ve trades of which only two trades were unproﬁ  table and there were no two 
“false” signals in a row in thirteen years. Once again, there is a huge difference in 
proﬁ  t in favor of the system relative to the index (274.60%) made at signiﬁ  cantly 
lower risk – exposure to the stock market risk accounted for only 60% of the total 
time. This resulted in avoidance of the two sharpest drops in the value in U.S. 
stock exchanges following the Great Depression – the bear markets of the 2000-
2002 and the 2008-2009 period, when the S&P 500 index slumped by 49% and 
56% respectively.
This ﬁ  nding is very important for the subject discussed here: market cycles from 
the 1990s on had the largest amplitudes since the Great Depression (1929-1933). 
The period from 1995 to 2010 is characterized by unusually long, clear and conti-
nuous trends. In bull markets between 1995 and 2000 and from 2003 to 2008, as 
well as in bear markets from 2000 to 2002 and from 2008 to 2009, stock prices 
strongly trended. Long-term moving averages are ideal instruments for riding the-
se long-term trends. Moving averages, however, are not nearly as good tools if the 
market does not move in a clearly deﬁ  ned trend, i.e. when the market moves si-
deways for a long time.12 In that case, the moving average system creates nume-
12 The terms “sideways movement” and “without trend” are often used as synonyms. This, however, should 
be understood only conditionally. In trendless periods, the market does not “stand still” but goes up and down V
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318 TABLE 3 
Testing the 50/200 EMA system and comparison with the S&P 500 index in the 
period from 2 September 1997 to 2 September 2010
Closing portfolio 
value (mu)
Average annual 
return (%)
S&P 500 119,969 1.41
50/200 EMA 174,804 4.39
Total number of trades (a)  5
Proﬁ  table trades 3
Non-proﬁ  table trades 2
Largest number of non-proﬁ  table trades in a row 1
Average duration of proﬁ  table trades (in days) 626
Average proﬁ  t per proﬁ  table trade (mu) 25,774
Average duration of non-proﬁ  table trades 
(in days)
43
Average loss per non-proﬁ  table trade (mu) -11,607
50/200 EMA proﬁ  t relative to S&P 500 proﬁ  t 274.60%
Total number of days in the market 1,966
Note: (a) A trade includes one purchase and one sale.
Source: Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.
FIGURE 5 
S&P 500 index and 50/200 EMA in the period from 2 September 1997 
to 2 September 2010
Source: Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.
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319 rous “false” signals, which generate many small losses in a row. Looking at histo-
rical stock price charts going back several decades, one sees many periods when 
the market moved sideways for months, even years (most notably, the 1966-82 
period). 
When the testing period is expanded to several decades (table 4), the buy and hold 
strategy ﬁ  nally gains advantage over attempts to time entries and exits from the 
market: the closing value of the market portfolio is 6.4 million monetary units vs. 
5.2 million monetary units made using the moving averages crossing. The trading 
system’s proﬁ  t is almost one-ﬁ  fth smaller (19.20%) than that of the index.
TABLE 4 
Testing the 50/200 EMA system and comparison with the S&P 500 index in the 
period from 3 January 1950 to 2 September 2010
Closing portfolio 
value (mu)
Average 
annual return 
(%)
S&P 500 6,477,380 7.11
50/200 EMA 5,252,740 6.74
Total number of trades (a) 29
Proﬁ  table trades 18
Non-proﬁ  table trades 11
Largest number of non-proﬁ  table trades in a row 2
Average duration of proﬁ  table trades (in days) 554
Average proﬁ  t per proﬁ  table trade (mu) 282,049
Average duration of non-proﬁ  table trades (in days) 85
Average loss per non-proﬁ  table trade (mu) -60,024
50/200 EMA proﬁ  t relative to S&P 500 proﬁ  t -19.20%
Total number of days in the market 10,918 (71.51%)
Note: (a) A trade includes one purchase and one sale.
Source: Reuters DataLink (Online data vendor), MetaStock v. 10.1.
Two conclusions arise: (a) a thorough veriﬁ  cation of trading system’s validity 
must be based on longer time series; and (b) in the long run, the EMH (the buy and 
hold strategy) wins – if one disregards the risk. The trading system is indeed less 
proﬁ  table for investors, but that proﬁ  t is earned with much less risk: an investor is 
rather whimsically (a good illustration is the CROBEX movement from 2002 to 2004). In such periods, the 
buy and hold strategy is not likely to show great returns, but neither will it show big losses. On the other hand, 
the use of moving averages in the same period will cause frequent market entries and exits in futile attempts 
to catch trends that never form. Although these losses are relatively small, if the market is without a trend for 
a longer period of time, small individual losses may eventually turn to a large one.V
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320 exposed to the stock market risk only 71.51% of the time. What that practically 
means is that the investor was kept safe of the most vicious bear markets of the 
second part of the 20th and early 21st century – 1969-70, 1973-74, 2000-02 and 
2008-09, as well as numerous minor ones13. The price paid for this insurance is the 
occasional trading “whipsaw” which in time compounds to a somewhat lower 
proﬁ  t than the buy and hold strategy.
5 DISCUSSION ON PROBLEMS WITH INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
Strikingly similar changes in autocorrelation of successive changes in stock prices 
in Zagreb and New York do not represent a surprise. Risk aversion and changes in 
risk attitudes can produce autocorrelation of price changes. This does not imply 
that changes in risk preferences can explain every situation of ambiguity invol-
ving theoretical priors and empirical results.14 For example, the speed of learning 
of sophisticated traders is an issue of critical importance for the interpretation of 
empirical results but is only weakly reﬂ  ected in the literature. If sophisticated 
traders emerge in every market (which equals an assumption that there are always 
some smart people around) and if only a few of them are strong enough to move 
the market toward the state of efﬁ  ciency, statistical similarities between Croatian 
and U.S. capital markets in the period before the crisis would hardly look surpri-
sing. Although it has been more than 30 years since the seminal contribution of 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), we still do not know much about the costs of infor-
mation acquisition and their impact on market processes, not to mention their re-
lations to the speed of learning.
Our analysis of the 50/200 EMA trading rule provokes an additional question 
about the nature and speed of learning. Recall that our trading rule, which beat the 
CROBEX, generated seven trades of which ﬁ  ve were losing ones and only two 
were proﬁ  table. Absolute return on proﬁ  table trades was much higher than abso-
lute return on losing trades, so the strategy won against the market index. What 
kind of learning, preferences and investment horizons are required for an investor 
to stick with a winning trading rule 50/200 EMA in the long run? Two loss making 
trades occurred in a row, so one can try to put oneself in the shoes of an investor 
who invests with a mutual fund whose manager sticks with the rule, but after 2 or 
3 years has nothing to show but two loss making trades. An optimal reaction in 
this case may be liquidating the investment. Also, recall the results from table 4: 
the EMA 50/200 trading system lost against the buy and hold S&P 500 strategy 
13 The only exception here is the crash of 1987 which happened so fast that the long-term oriented system 
had not enough time to adapt. 
14 In the last decade, a large body of literature has been developed attempting to model stock price behavior 
within a system populated by different types of agents (see e.g. Brock, Hommes and Wagener, 2005; and Verbič, 
2008). This literature is important as it allows modelling the market as a complex eco-system populated by dif-
ferent types of actors who initially have different risk preferences that change in different ways. The origins of 
this strand of literature can be traced back to Black’s (1986) idea of “noise traders”. Interactions of different 
types of traders (e.g. Black’s noise traders and Fama’s sophisticated traders) can produce complex dynamics 
of asset prices. For example Shefrin (2002) showed that sophisticated traders may abstain from trading even 
when they see a profit opportunity if they assess that risks increased. This may create closed loops reflected 
in sharp and clear trends as Fama’s sophisticated traders stop acting and bubbles are formed.V
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321 from 1950 to 2010, but who is the investor for whom 60 years represents a rele-
vant investment horizon?
Hence, the “discovery” of winning trading systems can be criticized from the per-
spective of the “beneﬁ  t of hindsight”: there is no guarantee that a trading system 
that was superior in the past would continue to generate the same result in the fu-
ture. By the same token, there is no guarantee that a superior trading system could 
be found (except by chance) in the past. In other words, public disclosure of a su-
perior trading system (as is the case in this paper) is always connected to the fol-
lowing question: would it have been so superior if discovered earlier and could it 
have been discovered earlier except by chance in the ﬁ  rst place? These questions 
are obviously linked with the learning problem: how do market agents learn in real 
time? It seems that focus of ﬁ  nancial theory on information sets came at the expe-
nse of lesser focus on actual learning processes. Perhaps more could be learned 
about market (in)efﬁ  ciency by directly observing the actual learning processes of 
market participants than from observing stock price time series and charts.15
Relevant investment horizons, costs of information acquisition and speed of lear-
ning are closely related with institutional investors’ constraints. EMH and its em-
pirical tests usually forget that the most powerful investors are institutionally or-
ganized. Financial intermediaries exist, inter alia, for the purpose of intermedia-
ting between clients with various preferences regarding risk and time. Sophistica-
ted traders are often leveraged and/or managing other people’s money. Both con-
strain their choices. For example, a fund manager – a strong believer in the 50/200 
EMA trading system, may be driven out of the market by clients who withdraw 
their money from her fund if she makes two loss making trades in the ﬁ  rst couple 
of years of operations. So, even if sophisticated trader is able to learn superior 
rules, maybe her investors cannot follow. It may take a long time for such a sophi-
sticated trader to earn her own capital and/or credibility to convince other sophi-
sticated investors that she has a winning trading strategy. In the meantime, techni-
cians and ﬁ  nancial market specialists may continue to discover superiority of the 
EMA 50/200 trading rule and interpret this as indication of an inefﬁ  cient market, 
while in reality this market may be efﬁ  cient for given risk and time preferences as 
well as distribution of investors’ knowledge. 
Generally, the less market participants are regulated and exposed to ﬁ  nancial leve-
rage (the more they manage own capital), the better their position to use occasio-
nal opportunities that appear in the market due to institutional limitations if they 
are knowledgeable enough to spot such opportunities and if their risk aversion 
15 Publication of a winning trading system in this paper will allow us or some other author(s) to test the 50/200 
EMA rule on CROBEX data in N years. If the same rule again beats the market in N years (backwards), 
one may logically conclude that the “hindsight problem” had no bearing on this case. The same applies to 
an issue of secrecy of a winning trading system. The problem could be analyzed even earlier by the “boot-
strap” technique.V
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322 does not prevent exploitation of such opportunities.16 Focus on institutional beha-
vior and organization of sophisticated traders may provide deeper insight into the 
context of market efﬁ  ciency than a focus on movements in market prices.
Finally, note that we obtained different results in statistical tests vs. trading rules: 
statistical tests show market efﬁ  ciency in the pre-crisis period (in the case of Croa-
tia more convincingly on monthly than on daily data) while the trading rule re-
veals market in(efﬁ  ciency) in both Croatia and U.S. throughout the whole period 
under investigation. However, the autocorrelation test ignores the fact that the 
equity market is only one among many interconnected ﬁ  nancial markets. The tra-
ding rule’s test explicitly allows for portfolio shifts but of very limited nature 
(there are two assets: equity and cash). Having this in mind, Ball (1978), fol-
lowing Fama (1976), observed that in a partial analysis it is impossible to know 
whether one tests the empirical strategy itself or the EMH. At the current stage of 
development of the theory and empirical tests, then, it is difﬁ  cult to state much 
more on market efﬁ  ciency, given empirical approach which we adopted in our 
work.
6 CONCLUSION
Both the Zagreb Stock Exchange and NYSE recorded signiﬁ  cant deviations of the 
autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient from zero at monthly frequencies, with noticeably lar-
ge variations of the autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient of price changes across time. The 
analysis of autocorrelation at daily frequencies shows that both markets are inef-
ﬁ  cient in statistical terms but the conclusion differs for the pre-crisis period when 
the U.S. market appears to be efﬁ  cient, while it is impossible to prove the inefﬁ  -
ciency of the Croatian market with a high level of conﬁ  dence. Moreover, a relati-
vely small value of the autocorrelation coefﬁ  cient of price changes indicates a 
level of market inefﬁ  ciency that was probably negligible from a traders’ perspec-
tive. 
The simple moving average crossover trading rule beats the CROBEX index de-
cisively in the 1997-2010 period, but with more losses than gains. The overall 
proﬁ  t of the trading system is generated thanks to proﬁ  ts that are several-fold hi-
gher than losses in absolute terms. The result suggests market inefﬁ  ciency, but it 
is methodologically questionable whether an ex post established trading rule could 
have been established ex ante in real time. 
The trading rule based on moving average gains a crucial advantage over the 
market average in long periods of downward trending prices, which are also pe-
riods of statistical inefﬁ  ciency and increase in risk aversion. If the occurrence of 
statistical dependence of price changes can be explained by rising risk aversion, 
the results of the trading rules analysis are compatible with those of the traditional 
16 Regulation and leverage obviously limit the set of possible transactions as they reduce the amount of risk 
that can be taken per unit of exposure and/or transaction.V
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323 statistical analysis. Hence no wonder that the same trading system credibly beats 
the S&P 500 index in the same observed period (from 1997 to 2010), which is 
characterized by clear trends. However, the success ratio of the system relative to 
the market average is not clear over a very long period. Results achieved by the 
system from 1950-2010 were lower than those obtained from holding the S&P 
500 index but they came with signiﬁ  cantly lower risk. 
In conclusion, statistical and trading rule analyses do not yield conclusive results 
regarding market efﬁ  ciency.V
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